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INTRODUCTION
What are the benefits and costs to the United States from stat-
utes, treaties, and "soft-law" initiatives that seek to constrain bribery
in international business transactions? Hard statistics are not availa-
ble, but we argue that much of the debate has been overly focused
on the possibility that U.S. firms will lose contracts and exports to
corrupt competitors, especially ones from emerging economies
such as China, Russia, or India.
Of primary importance is the United States Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),' which prohibits firms from paying bribes for
* Henry R. Luce Professor ofJurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University. Board Member, Transparency International - USA.
** MA in International Relations, Yale University, 2009; Class of 2013 Yale
Law School.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), amended by Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. 1,
102 Stat. 1415 and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
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the purpose of "obtaining or retaining" business abroad.2 The
United States has been enforcing this statute quite aggressively of
late, producing a backlash from portions of the business commu-
nity. The United States Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) ti-
des its recommendation for amending the FCPA Restoring Balance,
implying that the law is too stringent. The Chamber is careful to
support the anti-bribery aims of the statute, but its proposed
amendments would significantly weaken the law.3 In its more po-
lemical statements, the Chamber claims that the law is obsolete and
"a stumbling block for America's ability to compete in today's
global economy."4 In testimony before Congress, a lawyer repre-
senting the Chamber's position stated that "there is reason to be-
lieve that the FCPA has made U.S. businesses less competitive than
their foreign counterparts who do not have significant FCPA expo-
sure."5 According to the Chamber, the FCPA is a "relic of a time
before globalization transformed the U.S. economy and, until up-
dated, it will continue to hurt U.S. businesses."6 To us, it is surpris-
ing to see the Chamber argue that aggressive enforcement is less
important because of the globalization of business. We argue, in con-
trast, that enforcement has become more important as business
globalizes, especially because the United States is no longer alone
in penalizing overseas bribery. A treaty ratified by most major over-
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
3. See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES Acr 6-7 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance-fcpa.pdf. For a response to this docu-
ment that complements our own, see DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, OPEN So-
CIETY FOUNDATIONS, BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE
FOREIGN CORRUr PRACTICES Act 5-8 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.soros.
org/initiatives/washington/articles-publications/publications/busting-bribery-
20110916/Busting%2OBribery2Ol1September.pdf (going through the Chamber's
proposed amendments to the FCPA and offering a rebuttal to each one).
4. Press Release, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber Insti-
tute for Legal Reform: House Hearing is an Important Step Toward Modernizing
FCPA (June 14, 2011), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr
media/30/pressrelease/201 1/533.html.
5. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 111th Cong. 88 (2010)
(written testimony of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-11-30 Weissmann Testimony.pdf.
6. Harold Kim, House Hearing: An Important Step Toward Fixing the FCPA,
CHAMBERPOST (June 15, 2011), http://www.chamberpost.com/2011/06/house-
hearing-an-important-step-toward-fixing-the-fcpa/.
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seas investors generalizes the principles behind the FCPA to mul-
tinationals around the world.7
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act includes a section that requires firms in
extractive industries-oil, gas, and mining-to report payments to
governments where they operate.8 It has generated similar criti-
cisms. Firms claim that these provisions will harm U.S. firms operat-
ing in corrupt polities. For example, the American Petroleum
Institute, an industry lobby group, argues that U.S.-listed companies
will be placed at a competitive disadvantage if the new law causes
host governments to "select business partners on future projects
that do not have similar reporting requirements" or if non-report-
ing entities "utilize the . . . information to gain an advantage in
future bidding and contract negotiations." 9
From the point of view of the U.S. national interest, these
claims are overblown. Our aim is to shift the debate over the con-
trol of corruption toward the more comprehensive benefits that
may result from a strong U.S. stance against foreign bribery. If a
U.S. firm loses an individual contract to a corrupt competitor, the
cost to American society is not the profits that would have been
earned from the corrupt deal. Rather, we defend a more sophisti-
cated view of the loss that recognizes both that the firm can usually
shift its business elsewhere and that, even if the lost contract in-
volves a resource at a fixed location, that resource will generally
enter into international trade where it can be purchased by Ameri-
can customers.
Furthermore, even if some business is lost, there are long-term
benefits to the United States from moving toward a more honest
business environment. A strong U.S. policy against international
corruption can encourage other countries to follow suit, with posi-
tive effects on the efficiency and fairness of global trade and invest-
ment, and can help support government reform efforts in host
7. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M.
4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213, 2220 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]
(adding section 13(q) entitled "Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Is-
suers" to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
9. Letter from Kyle Isakower, Vice President of Regulatory & Econ. Policy,
Am. Petroleum Inst., & Patrick T. Mulva, Chairman of the Fin. Comm., Am. Petro-
leum Inst., to Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-27.pdf.
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countries. Overall, we believe that the benefits to the United States
and its standing in the world outweigh the net costs associated with
the possibility of lost contracts.
In Part I we introduce the basic legal framework that seeks to
constrain corruption in international business. There are three ba-
sic sources of legal constraints. The first source derives its authority
from the FCPA10 and its generalization, the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention." The second is the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, which covers a broader range of countries and
corrupt activities.' 2 Finally, one section of the Dodd-Frank Act13 re-
quires firms in extractive industries to report payments under rules
similar to those governing the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, a voluntary effort.14
In Part II we make our basic argument concerning the proper
way to compute the costs for the U.S. economy, as opposed to the
costs only to U.S. firms. In Part III we discuss the potential long-
term benefits of vigorous enforcement and of ongoing soft-law ini-
tiatives. Finally, we conclude in Part IV with a return to the Cham-
ber's claims.
I.
THE LEGAL AND SOFT-LAW FRAMEWORK
FOR U.S. BUSINESS
The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in
the aftermath of the Watergate scandals, which revealed widespread
payments by U.S. firms operating abroad to get and retain busi-
ness. 15 It was amended in 1988 to exempt "facilitating payments"
from the reach of the statute' 6 and again in 1998 to make U.S. law
10. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. Kim, supra note 6.
12. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, art. 15, Dec. 11, 2003, S. TREmT
Doc. No. 109-06, at 33-34, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, 154-55.
13. Dodd-Frank Act § 1504, 124 Stat. at 2220.
14. For more information on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive, see EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org (last visited
Sept. 26, 2011).
15. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Re-
marks Before the Minority Corporate Counsel 2008 CLE Expo (Mar. 27, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch327081ct.
htm).
16. Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Ex-
pansion Explained, Defended, and justified, 29 REv. LITIG. 439, 446 (2010).
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compatible with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.' 7 The statute
makes it an offense for U.S. firms to pay bribes to get business
abroad, with both the corporation and its officers potentially sub-
ject to criminal liability.18 Other provisions dealing with books and
records apply only to firms listed on the stock exchanges.19 Enforce-
ment authority lies with both the Department ofJustice (DOJ) and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Whereas the SEC
may only pursue civil actions against issuers, that is, companies
listed on U.S. stock exchanges, the DOJ may enforce criminal pen-
alties under both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions against
issuers and non-issuers. 20
In the midst of the Watergate scandal it was difficult for busi-
nesses to oppose the proposed law. The Senate passed S. 3664 by a
unanimous 86-0 vote on September 15, 1976.21 The House of Rep-
resentatives adjourned before completing work on this legislation, 22
but S. 305, identical to S. 3664, was introduced shortly after the
95th Congress convened inJanuary 1977. The House passed accom-
panying bill H.R. 3815 by voice vote on September 20, 1977 with a
quorum.23 The House report noted,
More than 400 corporations have admitted making ques-
tionable or illegal payments....
The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of
foreign officials . .. is unethical.... But not only is it unethical,
it is bad business as well. ... In short, it rewards corruption
instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to
lower their standards or risk losing business.24
Similarly, the Senate report stated, "The image of American
democracy abroad has been tarnished. Confidence in the financial
integrity of our corporations has been impaired. The efficient func-
tioning of our capital markets has been hampered."2 5 Once the law
was in place, it would prove hard for business openly to oppose it
because firms feared that they would suffer a public relations blow
17. Id. at 447-48.
18. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B).
20. See infra Part II.A.




23. H.R. RiEP. No. 95-640, at 7 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4101.
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from being labeled in favor of bribery. Nevertheless, some firms ar-
gued that they had lost contracts due to their compliance with the
law.26 However, the weakening of the law in 1988 to exclude facili-
tating payments was more a reflection of actual enforcement priori-
ties and realities than a serious gutting of the law. 2 7
Enforcement of the FCPA in the United States has had its ups
and downs, but it has been relatively stringent in recent years. 28
However, few cases actually go to trial.29 Therefore, the law has not
benefitted from judicial efforts to elucidate vague aspects of the
statute. Defendants prefer to settle, often to preserve their ability to
bid on U.S. government contracts. Thus, settlements are an-
nounced with considerable fanfare, but the actual wrongdoing ad-
mitted by a firm and its officers may seem relatively trivial.30 Many
offenses involve only the books and records aspects of the law,
which are not criminal violations.31 Thus, the primary deterrent ef-
fect of the law may be the stigma attached to being penalized under
26. See, e.g., Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a
Private Right ofAction, 82 CALF. L. REV. 185, 208 (1994) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT OF FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 59 (1981)) (reporting the results of a
1981 General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of 250 of the top 1000 corporations
in the United States, which stated that "30% of the respondents claimed that the
Act had caused a decrease in business").
27. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 257-58 (1997) (noting
that the 1988 Amendments strengthened the FCPA because "the 1988 Amend-
ments to the FCPA have reduced or eliminated the most troublesome sources of
vagueness [in the law]").
28. See, e.g., Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 90-91 (2010); Mike Koehler, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L.
REV. 389, 389 (2010); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legis-
lation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489,
495-96 (2011).
29. Mark Brzenzinski & Alex Brackett, Foreign Bribery and Illegal Exports, PUB.
INT. REP., Spring 2011, at 14, 16 n.8.
30. For example, U.K. firm BAE Systems agreed to pay a $400 million fine to
settle one charge of "conspiring to ... make false statements." Press Release, U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million
Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-
crm-209.html. See also Westbrook, supra note 28, at 530-31 ("The SEC Enforce-
ment Division, in particular, has been described as being in a 'hyper-aggressive
phase,' in which it applies existing laws in 'novel and creative ways' . . . .").
31. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006). See also
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS,
2, 5, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
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the statute. This may mostly deter large diversified firms that deal
with the government as regulator, tax collector, and customer and
also deter firms that depend upon a good reputation with private
customers to sustain their business. It may be less effective against
smaller or less diversified companies.
Over time, enforcement of the FCPA generated support in the
U.S. business community for an international treaty to generalize
the U.S. approach to other countries that are the major sources of
overseas investment.32 In the early nineties, Transparency Interna-
tional (TI) was founded by Peter Eigen, a retired World Bank offi-
cial, and several colleagues.33 TI has an anti-corruption mission that
initially focused on limiting corruption in international business
dealings. It represents a collaboration between business interests
and international governance reformers that pushes for change in
the practices of multinational firms and host governments. TI be-
came an early supporter of an international treaty and, over several
years, pushed for the drafting, signing, and ratification of what be-
came the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. A Swiss lawyer and pro-
fessor, Mark Pieth, led the drafting process,34 but the support of the
U.S. government and the U.S. business community was politically
crucial.35
The Convention tracks the FCPA, but it allows individual states
to tailor their compliance to suit their own legal systems.36 For ex-
ample, not all countries permit corporations to be criminally liable,
so enforcement in those cases focuses on individuals and, perhaps,
on civil fines levied on firms.37 Enforcement of the Convention re-
lies on the initiative of signatories because its own enforcement
mechanisms are weak. The OECD has a working group that meets
periodically to assess progress, and it carries out country-level evalu-
32. For a list of the major sources of FDI, see infra note 99.
33. Advisory Council, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/
aboutcus/organisation/advscouncil (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
34. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 2 (2008).
35. See David Metcalfe, The OECD Agreement to Criminalize Bribery: A Negotiation
Analytic Perspective, 5 INT'L NEGOTIATION 129, 134-35 (2000).
36. See, e.g., OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, at 4, 37
I.L.M. at 4-5 ("Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accor-
dance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the
bribery of a foreign public official.").
37. OECD Demands the Slovak Republic Establish Corporate Liability for Foreign Brib-
ery, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 18,
2010), http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en 21571361_44315115_4441
9261_1_1_1_1,OO.html.
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ations required by the Convention.38 Transparency International
publishes its own reviews.39 However, the treaty has no official sanc-
tioning mechanisms. Some have proposed an international tribunal
to deal with corporations that violate the treaty,40 but actual en-
forcement has no such backup.
In 2000, shortly after the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention en-
tered into force, the United Nations General Assembly established a
committee to negotiate a convention against corruption. After sev-
eral negotiating sessions, the General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2003.41 Again, the
United States supported this international effort and was among
the first countries to sign and ratify the U.N. Convention. The U.S.
permanent representative to the United Nations stated, "Ten years
ago, bribes were still tax deductible in some countries and no inter-
national anti-corruption treaties existed. Today's resolution is
therefore a milestone achievement in the global effort to ensure
transparency, fairness and justice in public affairs."4 2 The U.N. Con-
vention entered into force in the United States in 2005 after the
thirtieth country ratified it, and 153 countries, in addition to the
European Union, are now parties to the U.N. Convention."4
Although the U.N. Convention Against Corruption was devel-
oped in light of previous anti-corruption instruments, including the
FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, it is broader in
scope, extending beyond bribery of foreign public officials to ad-
38. For OECD reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention, see Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.
org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649-34859 1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011).
39. TI Progress Report: Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/global
priorities/international conventions/projects-conventions/oecd convention (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011).
40. See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32
MIcH. J. INT'L LAw 129, 160 (2010).
41. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 12.
42. Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 169, 184 (2004) (quoting U.N. GAOR, 58th
Sess., 50th plen. mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.50 (Oct. 31, 2003)).
43. Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Convention Against Cor-
ruption Ratified by 30th State, Will Enter into Force 14 December 2005, U.N. Press
Release L/T/4389 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2005/1t4389.doc.htm.
44. UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of May 2011, U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.
html (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
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dress other facets of corruption, including trading in influence,
money laundering, and embezzlement.45 It also covers countries
that are not yet party to any other anti-corruption instrument. 46 In
addition, the U.N. Convention supports the criminalization of cor-
ruption in the private sector.47 It focuses on international coopera-
tion, encouraging states to exchange information, and includes
detailed provisions on cooperative law enforcement mechanisms
like extradition.48 However, similar to the OECD, the United Na-
tions does not have the power to enforce compliance,49 and the
impact of the Convention is uneven across countries due to differ-
ing enforcement levels and because countries may ratify it with
reservations.
In recent years several voluntary efforts have sought to increase
transparency and to limit corruption, especially in the extractive in-
dustries. Two of the most significant initiatives are Publish What
You Pay (PWYP),50 a global coalition of civil society groups working
to convince firms to publicize payments, and the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI)," an international initiative
comprising governments, firms, and civil society groups that works
with governments to publish information on all types of payments
connected to extractive companies' business activities. The idea is
that even without strong prosecutorial efforts, information on pay-
ments, even legal ones, can help citizens and civil society groups to
monitor the behavior of governments and firms.
Civil society organizations, such as PWYP, Revenue Watch, and
Global Witness, lobby for transparency in the extractive industries
and were key supporters of section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, a
provision requiring firms in extractive industries to publish what
45. International Trade Alert: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, 5-6 (Jan. 14, 2004), http://www.akin
gump.com/files/Publication/eb85bdf-4b9d-49f2-bb83-oal9faOe3la5/Presenta-
tion/PublicationAttachment/ddf3ac5-50e4el6-b3df-Obf9e32f5ad3/628.pdf.
46. Lucinda A. Low, Thomas K. Sprange & Milos Barutciski, Global Anti-Cor-
ruption Standard and Enforcement: Implications for Energy Companies, 3 J. WORLD EN-
ERGY L. & Bus. 166, 171-72 (2010). Russia, however, has been invited by the OECD
to join their Working Group and to accede to the Convention. See OECD Invites
Russia to join Anti-Bribery Convention, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT (May, 25, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,
en_21571361_44315115_47983768_1_1_1_1,00.html.
47. International Trade Alert, supra note 45, at 6.
48. Id. at 5, 7.
49. Id. at 7.
50. For more information on PWYP, see PUBLISH WHAT YOu PAY, http://www.
publishwhatyoupay.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
51. See EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 14.
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they pay in an annual report under SEC oversight.52 Senators Ben-
jamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) introduced
section 1504, also known as the Cardin-Lugar amendment.53 In ad-
dition, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to
which conflict minerals are "necessary to the functionality or pro-
duction" of their products to disclose whether the minerals
originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or a bordering
country. 54 The final rules implementing these sections had not yet
been issued at the time of publication, but, at the very least, they
will provide information on contracting and sourcing practices in
these sectors.
These initiatives in U.S. law and in international treaties and
soft-law have produced a heightened interest in this aspect of cor-
porate social responsibility and have led to the development of cor-
porate compliance programs to signal a firm's credible
commitment to integrity. For example, General Electric (GE),
which received the 2010 Transparency International-USA Corpo-
rate Leadership Award for a "sustained commitment to fostering a
corporate culture of integrity,"55 disseminates a Code of Conduct
among GE employees requiring compliance with policies designed
to promote high standards of integrity.5 6 The hope of the firm's
management is that, even if an employee pays a bribe, prosecutors
will view the employee as a solitary wrongdoer who is violating firm
policy, not a faithful servant of superior officials who are willing to
make payoffs in the name of profit. However, under the FCPA there
is currently no formal "compliance defense," that is, a U.S. firm is
still liable even when an employee "circumvent[s] compliance mea-
sures that [are] otherwise reasonable in identifying and preventing
such violations."5 7 In contrast, the recently enacted U.K. Bribery
52. Pushing for Probity, 52 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL 6, 7 (2011), available at http://
www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3884/Pushing-for-probity.
53. The Cardin-Lugar Amendment (Dodd-Frank 1504), PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about/stock-listings/cardin-lugar-amend-
ment-dodd-frank-1504 (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
54. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2214
(2010).
55. Press Release, Transparency Int'l-USA, Transparency International-USA
Honors Paul Volcker and GE at Integrity Awards Dinner (Dec. 9, 2010), http://
www.transparency-usa.org/news/documents/2010.12.9TI-USAPressRelease-Integ-
rityAwardsDinner.pdf.
56. GENERAL ELECTRIC, THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER 3 (2005), available at
www.ge.com/filescitizenship/pdf/TheSpirit&TheLetter.pdf.
57. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 11; see also Joe Palazzolo, An FCPA
Compliance Defense? No Way, Breuer Says, WSJ BLOCS (Apr. 1, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/04/01 /an-fcpa-compliance-defense-no-
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Act of 2010 allows an "adequate procedures" defense, 58 which al-
lows companies to prove that they "maintained 'adequate proce-
dures' to prevent associated persons from committing bribery."' 9
Not all firms oppose U.S. laws designed to limit overseas brib-
ery. Although business firms generally resist government attempts
to regulate their behavior, in some cases firms may support regula-
tion. For example, small firms and potential entrants may support
vigorous antitrust enforcement against entrenched monopolists.
Firms producing potentially dangerous products may support gov-
ernment standards that permit the firms to overcome consumer
worries and to limit their liability. Firms may support regulations
that are relatively cheap for them but that raise rivals' costs.60 In the
anti-corruption area, firm owners and managers that seek to oper-
ate honestly will benefit from efforts to constrain corrupt firms. GE
and other firms with strong internal compliance systems may fall
into that category. Being able to refuse a bribe demand by referring
to legal constraints may help a firm's bottom line if its product is so
superior that a public official cannot turn to a corrupt competitor
without arousing suspicion.
Nevertheless, under other conditions, firms may believe that
they are losing business to corrupt competitors. This was, after all,
much of the motivation for the strong U.S. government support of
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,61 and it is part of the debate
over the rise of firms from China and other emerging economies,
which lack similar constraints. 62 Despite these concerns, a new Chi-
way-breuer-says/ (reporting that " [t] he chief of the Justice Department's Criminal
Division flatly rejected the need for a compliance defense in the FCPA").
58. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (Eng.).
59. F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British Are
Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and joins the International Fight
Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 30 (2010).
60. See generally Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73
AM. ECON. REv. 267, 267 (1983).
61. See, e.g., Todd Swanson, Note, Greasing the Wheels: British Deficiencies in Rela-
tion to American Clarity in International Anti-Corruption Law, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 397, 401 (2007) ("This situation, where U.S. firms' international competitors
were not subject to the same criminal sanctions for bribery, put U.S. citizens and
companies in a difficult competitive position in the ever growing global economy.
This situation, along with the ill effects bribery has on states, particularly in the
developing world, was to be rectified by the conventions, particularly the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions .... .").
62. See, e.g., Henry (Litong) Chen & Xiaosong Zhou, Possible Impacts of the
Dodd-Frank Act on U.S. Companies Doing Business in Asia, BLOOMBERG L. REP. ASIA
PAc. L., June 6, 2011, at 18-19, available at http://www.mwechinalaw.com/
uploads/doc/chenzhou-doddfrank.pdf ("Some host countries, despite the exis-
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nese law, which took effect in May 2011, suggests that emerging
economies are also taking steps to tackle corruption. The amend-
ment to China's criminal law prohibits bribery of foreign officials
and helps to satisfy China's obligations under the U.N. Convention
Against Corruption.6 3
In spite of such developments, the current difficult economic
climate and the Republican control of the House of Representatives
have encouraged efforts to limit the reach of anti-corruption laws.
Those seeking to limit the FCPA see an opening. We turn now to
arguments that can blunt the force of these arguments.
II.
THE COSTS TO THE UNITED STATES OF LIMITING
CORRUPTION BY U.S. FIRMS
We argue that the claimed harm to U.S. interests from existing
anti-corruption law is much exaggerated. Of course, individual con-
tracts may have been lost because of refusals to pay bribes. Alterna-
tively, multinationals may have developed ways to work around the
law by providing extra benefits that are nominally legal, such as
contributions to a charity associated with a politician's family or po-
litical allies, the use of local, well-connected suppliers, or the provi-
sion of local public goods. 6 4 However, assuming that workarounds
tence of strict anti-bribery and -corruption laws, may not enforce their laws evenly.
Therefore, a U.S. company would be made less competitive in the host country
than a local company because the local company may obtain or retain business by
paying bribes to officials (as well as to other bribe recipients).").
63. George J. Terwilliger III, Alistair Graham, Darryl S. Lew, Daniel Levin &
Charlie Monteith, CHINA'S NEw ANTI-CORRUPTION LAw GOES INTo EFFECT MAY 1,
2011, WHITE & CASE LLP (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-
04202011/.
64. For example, a 2006 survey of 350 international companies based in Bra-
zil, Germany, France, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States commissioned by Control Risks and Simmons & Simmons found that
almost "two-thirds of respondents believed that companies in their own country
either 'regularly' or 'occasionally' seek to gain a business advantage through mak-
ing donations to charities favored by decision-makers." CONTROL RISKS GROUP LTD.
& SIMMONS & SIMMONS LLP, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ATTITUDES TO CORRUPTION-
SURVEY 2006, at 4, 13 (2006), available at http://www.control-risks.com/OurThink-
ing/CRsDocumentDownload/International%2business%20attitudes%20to%20
corruption%20survey_2006.pdf. Although charitable donations are not explicitly
illegal under the FCPA, donations made for the "sole purpose of gaining political
advantage could lead to legal hazards." JOHN BRAY, CONTROL RISKS, FACING UP TO
CORRUPTION 2007: A PRACrIcAL BUSINESS GUIDE 73 (2007), available at http://www.
control-risks.com/pdf/Facing-up-to-corruption.pdf. For example, in 2004, the
Schering-Plough Corporation paid a $500,000 civil penalty to the SEC for violating
the FCPA accounting provisions after it recorded payments made to a charity spe-
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are not always possible and that the law does, in fact, limit payoffs,
we examine the law's potential consequences. We take up two con-
cerns raised with respect to both the FCPA/OECD Convention and
the Dodd-Frank/EITI initiatives.
First, in Part A we discuss coverage. How broadly does U.S. law
reach? In other words, how serious is the concern that the home
countries of other investors either do not enforce their own laws or
are outside the international anti-corruption framework? Aspects of
both the FCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act cover all firms listed on
U.S. exchanges, and many major international firms list on U.S. ex-
changes. We look at a few specific national markets to highlight the
relatively broad coverage of U.S. anti-corruption laws.
Second, in Part B we argue that, even if some U.S. businesses
lose contracts abroad because of U.S. anti-corruption initiatives, the
losses to the U.S. economy are less than has sometimes been
claimed. There are two distinct cases: footloose firms and govern-
ment contractors (Part B.1), on the one hand, and investments tied
to the location of resources (Part B.2), on the other.
A firm in a footloose manufacturing sector may lose a contract
in one country and then turn to another or even invest inside the
United States. A firm that loses a government contract may bid on
another one elsewhere in the world. The loss to the firm is then not
the value of the lost contract but only the marginal loss from oper-
ating in or selling to a somewhat less profitable and less corrupt
location, taking into account the benefit of not paying a bribe. Fur-
thermore, if a firm's management condones bribery to get business,
it may create a culture of illegality inside the firm that encourages
the firm's own employees and suppliers to steal from it, thus reduc-
ing the benefits of overlooking payoffs. Furthermore, the loss to the
U.S. economy is considerably less than the loss to the firm so long
as the firm is not 100 percent U.S.-owned or so long as some firms
that lose contracts abroad invest at home instead.
In contrast, investors in the petroleum industry or in the hard
rock mineral sector are limited to countries where these resources
are located, and many deposits are in countries that rank highly on
cializing in historic preservation as "medical donations." Id.; see also John P.
Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the Increasing
Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 Bus. LAw. 135, 148-49 (2005) (describing the SEC
complaint against Schering-Plough Corporation "for violating the books and
records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA" based on incorrectly record-
ing "charitable contributions").
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corruption indices. 65 Firms may have several choices, but no poten-
tial investment site may seem particularly "honest." As resources are
exhausted in relatively honest countries, firms will move elsewhere.
To take an example from outside the United States, as the North
Sea field moves towards depletion, Statoil, the largest Norwegian oil
and gas producer, is seeking investments elsewhere in less honest
countries, such as Angola.66 In the case of the U.S., the cost to the
economy, not just to U.S. firms and business owners, is not the
value of the lost deal so long as the resource enters into the interna-
tional market where it can be purchased by U.S. customers. The
firm's U.S. shareholders may suffer a marginal loss of profit, but if
prices are determined internationally, the identity of the firm that
obtains the contract or concession will have little impact on U.S.
citizens and firms that use the resource.
A. Coverage
In considering any costs that U.S. transparency laws may im-
pose on U.S. firms, it is important to keep in mind that the scope of
U.S. anti-corruption law is broad. For example, the jurisdiction of
the FCPA extends beyond U.S. companies and citizens. The anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit, in addition to U.S. compa-
nies and citizens, "foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S.
stock exchange ... or any person while in U.S. territory from: (i)
corruptly paying, offering to pay, promising to pay, or authorizing
the payment of money, a gift, or anything of value; (ii) to a foreign
official; (iii) in order to obtain or retain business."67 The account-
ing provisions of the FCPA cover SEC issuers, i.e., "publicly-held
companies with shares traded on a U.S. exchange."68 Therefore,
the DOJ and the SEC may enforce penalties against both U.S. and
foreign issuers; the DOJ may also enforce civil penalties under the
anti-bribery provisions with respect to non-issuers covered by the
65. For example, out of 178 countries, Russia ranks 154th, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ranks 164th, Angola ranks 168th, and Iraq ranks 175th.
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, at 3 (2010), http://
www.transparency.org/content/download/55725/890310/CPI-report-ForWeb.
pdf.
66. On Transparency International's corruption index, Norway ranks 10th
while Angola ranks 168th. Id. at 2-3. Statoil has publically announced plans in
Angola. Press Release, Statoil, Statoil Identified for Pre-salt Operatorships in An-
gola (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2011/
Pages/24JanAngola.aspx.
67. Koehler, supra note 28, at 389-90 (paraphrasing the language of FCPA,
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, to clarify its meaning).
68. Id. at 395.
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FCPA; and the DOJ may pursue action against both U.S. and non-
U.S. citizens. In fact, following the 1998 amendment to the FCPA,
the DOJ may prosecute non-U.S. citizens who neither reside nor do
business in the United States based solely on territorial
jurisdiction.69
Although the jurisdiction of the FCPA is expansive, tradition-
ally the DOJ and the SEC have taken action primarily against "U.S.
publicly traded companies or U.S. companies doing business
abroad."70 However, enforcement of the FCPA has increased enor-
mously in recent years,71 and the DOJ and the SEC are more fre-
quently "assert[ing] jurisdiction over a foreign company based on
its status as an Issuer."72 This occurred for the first time in 2006
when the DOJ pursued criminal actions against Statoil, the Norwe-
gian oil company, "for improper payments to Iranian officials."73 By
2010, such actions had become more commonplace. Ten out of the
twenty-three enforcement actions resolved that year were settle-
ments with non-U.S. companies; eight of these ten settlements
ranked among the largest in the history of the FCPA.74 To date, the
largest FCPA settlement was made by the German company Sie-
mens, which paid $800 million in 2008.7
The FCPA provisions are also enforced against non-U.S. citi-
zens. Ten such actions were resolved or pending in 2010.76 Many of
these cases involve actions taken against non-U.S. agents of U.S.
companies.77 The DOJ and the SEC have also pursued actions
69. Westbrook, supra note 28, at 553-54.
70. Daniel Margolis &James Wheaton, Non-U.S. Companies May Also Be Subject
to the FCPA, 1 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 168, 168 (2009), available at www.pillsburylaw.
com/siteFiles/Publications/961FAE604BDB25EB4E6C63B250A3AAE.pdf.
71. "During the first twenty-eight years that the FCPA was in force, the SEC
and the DOJ typically initiated just two or three cases a year. . . . Fines, when
assessed, seldom exceeded $1,000,000.. .. [Now] the SEC and DOJ are bringing
ten times as many cases as in prior years. There are estimated to be a record 140
open FCPA investigations. Fines are also increasing dramatically." Westbrook,
supra note 28, at 495-96 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
72. Margolis & Wheaton, supra note 70, at 170.
73. Westbrook, supra note 28, at 551-52.
74. See 2010 FCPA Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 3, 2011, 7:02 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/1/3/2010-fcpa-enforcement-index.html.
75. See id.; Japan's JGC Makes Top Ten, THE FCPA BLOG (Apr. 7, 2011, 6:38
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/4/7/japans-jgc-makes-top-ten.html.
76. See 2010 FCPA Enforcement Index, supra note 74.
77. For example, in 2009 the DOJ took action against Ousama Naaman, a
Canadian citizen, because he was considered to have been acting "'on behalf of a
publicly traded U.S. chemical company and its subsidiary."' Westbrook, supra note
28, at 552 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Canadian National
Charged with Foreign Bribery and Paying Kickbacks Under the Oil for Food Pro-
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against non-U.S. individuals based on broader claims of jurisdic-
tion. For example, in the BAE investigation, "the DOJ asserted juris-
diction based on the suspicion that the bribes had been routed
through U.S. banks."78
Active enforcement of the FCPA is expected to continue. A
generous provision rewarding whistleblowers was included in the
Dodd-Frank Act,7 9 with final rules issued by the SEC on May 25,
2011.80 The final rules state that a whistleblower who provides "orig-
inal information" leading to "a monetary sanction in excess of
$1,000,000" will receive "10 to 30 percent of the total monetary
sanctions collected in those proceedings."83 For example, in 2010,
an employee of GlaxoSmithKline received $96 million as a reward
for reporting FCPA violations at one of the company's facilities in
Puerto Rico.82 It is claimed that the SEC has received at least one
FCPA tip a day following the enactment of section 922.83
Furthermore, other American statutory provisions that deal
with corruption have a broad reach. For example, section 1504 of
the Dodd-Frank Act, titled "Disclosure of Payments by Resource Ex-
traction Issuers," imposes new financial disclosure requirements on
all resource extraction companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange.84
It requires such resource extraction issuers to disclose: "(i) the type
and total amount of ... payments made for each project of the
resource extraction issuer relating to the commercial development
of oil, natural gas, or minerals, and (ii) the type and total amount
of such payments made to each government."85 This statutory provi-
sion is unprecedented in requiring such disclosure at the project-
gram (July 31, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-
757.html).
78. Id. at 552-53.
79. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841
(2010).
80. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
34,384 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final2011/34-64545.pdf.
81. Id. at 34,328.
82. Richard Levick, A Whole New Ballgame: Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Provisions,
THE COMMUNICATORS BLOG (Nov. 2, 2010 1:53 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/
richardlevick/page/10/.
83. Westbrook, supra note 28, at 525.
84. Dodd-Frank Act § 1504, 124 Stat. at 2220 (defining a "resource extraction
issuer" as an issuer that "(i) is required to file an annual report with the SEC, and
(ii) engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Dodd-Frank Act § 1504, 124 Stat. at 2221.
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level, as opposed to data aggregated at the country- or continent-
level.86
The American Petroleum Institute claims that such disclosures
will render U.S. companies less competitive vis-A-vis their non-SEC-
registered peers. However, to take one example, a preliminary anal-
ysis of the impact of the new financial disclosures required by sec-
tion 1504 on oil companies operating in Angola suggests that these
concerns are overstated, at least in that country.87 Angola is a repre-
sentative oil market because of its reputation for corruption,88 its
importance as a supplier of oil to the United States,89 and its efforts
to promote new oil exploration in which foreign oil companies are
invited to participate.90 Currently, Sonangol, the Angolan national
oil company, and foreign oil companies BP (U.K), Chevron (U.S.),
Eni (Italy), ExxonMobil (U.S.), Statoil (Norway), and Total
(France) dominate upstream exploration and production activities
in Angola.9 All of the foreign companies, including Statoil, are reg-
istered with the SEC and will be subject to the disclosure require-
ments of section 1504.92 Sonangol is a non-issuer, but as the state
oil company and sole concessionaire with a stake in all upstream
86. EITI, for example, requires "regular publication of all material oil, gas
and mining payments by companies to governments," i.e., country-level disclo-
sures. The EITI Principles and Criteria, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/eiti/principles (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
87. See Sinead Hunt, Refining Black Gold: The Dodd-Frank Act and Corruption in
the Oil Industry, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2011) (manu-
script at 27, 31).
88. Angola was ranked 168th out of 178 countries in Transparency Interna-
tional's 2010 Corruption Perception Index. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 65, at
3.
89. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: ANGOLA 2 (2010),
available at http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Angola/pdf.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Wendell Roelf, Angola Sees Next Offshore Bid Round in 2011,
REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2010, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/
idAFJOE6820BP20100903.
91. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 89, at 3-5.
92. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220-21
(2010). Section 1504 covers specifically "a subsidiary of the resource extraction
issuer." Id. Moreover, all of these companies perform their upstream activities in
Angola through subsidiaries of which the parent company has 100% ownership.
Eni SpA, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at E-9 (Apr. 7, 2011); Statoil ASA, Annual
Report (Form 20-F) 89 (Mar. 25, 2011); BP p.l.c., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 220
(Mar. 2, 2011); Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Ex. 21 (Feb. 25,
2011); Chevron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at E4 to -5 (Feb. 24, 2011);
CHEVRON, ANGOLA FAcr SHEET 4 (2011) (noting Cabinda, Chevron's wholly owned
subsidiary, operates in Angola).
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activities it will not gain a greater market share due to section
1504-it is already the key actor in the Angolan oil sector.93
The comparative advantage that U.S. oil companies and other
SEC-registrants enjoy in terms of expertise and experience in the
new frontiers of oil exploration will likely mitigate any disadvan-
tages that section 1504 imposes. Angola is not unique in this re-
spect. As global oil reserves decrease, oil exploration will be pushed
to new limits, and the same factors that mitigate the potentially dis-
advantageous effects of section 1504 can be expected to hold true
in other oil markets. As oil exploration continues into riskier envi-
ronments, technological capacity will remain a critical factor for
winning bids.
The general organization of this sector, i.e., national compa-
nies dominant within their own boundaries and SEC-registered
companies holding the majority of the remaining market share, ap-
pears to be prevalent in other extractive industries. In the gas sec-
tor, for example, major gas-producing countries, such as Algeria,
Indonesia, and Qatar, are structured in this way.94 In other cases,
such as Russia and China, a national gas company dominates with-
out significant international presence. 95 But there is only one
prominent case in which foreign state-owned gas companies, in ad-
dition to the host country national gas company, dominate the gas
sector. This is the case in Iran, but this situation is due primarily to
Iran's unfavorable investment climate, which led to voluntary
divestments by major international gas companies. This opened up
93. While the main oil companies operating currently in Angola, apart from
Sonangol, are equally subject to the new disclosure requirements, it is feasible that
they may become less competitive with respect to non-SEC registrants. In a 2011
bidding round for new licenses, however, the government selected seven compa-
nies, all SEC-registrants, to operate new deepwater blocks. See Angola Takes Pre-salt
Plunge, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Mar. 2011, at 37. The more important factor in
granting these new licenses appears to be the extensive experience and technologi-
cal capacity of these companies that is critical for exploration in more challenging
environments. See id.
94. For Algeria, see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: AL-
GERIA 4-5 (2009), http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Algeria/pdf.pdf. For Indone-
sia, see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: INDONESIA 3-4 (2011),
http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Indonesia/pdf.pdf. For Qatar, see U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: QATAR 5 (2011), http://www.eia.gov/
EMEU/cabs/Qatar/pdf.pdf.
95. For China, see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS:
CHINA 12 (2011), http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/China/pdf.pdf. For Russia, see
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: RussIA 7 (2011), http://www.
eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Russia/pdf.pdf.
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the market for foreign companies with large government stakes,
such as Russia's Gazprom. 96
More generally, within the extractive industries that are prone
to corruption,97 a high proportion of multinational firms list on the
U.S. exchanges or have agreed voluntarily to provide most of the
information required by the new U.S. statute.98 It seems unlikely
that firms will withdraw from the U.S. exchanges to avoid the re-
ports required under the statute. Such actions are especially un-
likely if withdrawals are publicized by watchdog groups and raise
suspicion that the firms are engaged in corrupt dealings. Because
most such firms are located in countries that have ratified the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and/or the U.N. Convention
Against Corruption, withdrawing from the U.S. stock market would
be unattractive if it sends a signal to home country or host country
prosecutors to look closely at the firm's international business
dealings.
Additionally, United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment statistics for foreign direct investment (FDI) document that
the bulk of FDI flows are between countries that are party to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.99 Transparency International
96. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: IRAN 8 (2011), http:/
/www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf.
97. According to the Transparency International Bribe Payers Index, the five
most corrupt industries in the world are (1) public works contracts and construc-
tion, (2) real estate and property development, (3) oil and gas, (4) heavy manufac-
turing, and (5) mining. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEx 2008, at 11
(2008), http://www.transparency.org/content/download/392
7 5/622457 .
98. Questions and Answers: Extractive Industry Payment Disclosure Provision in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,
http://www.pwypusa.org/sites/default/files/Q%20%26%20A%200n%2Disclo-
sure%20Provision%20in%20Dodd-Frank%20WSR%20%26%20CPA.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 30, 2011) ("The provision covers 90% of the major internationally
operating oil and gas companies."). In addition, some major oil companies like
Rosneft (Russia) also file reports with the SEC voluntarily. See Isakower & Mulva,
supra note 9, Attach. B.
99. In 2008, the top ten countries in terms of inward FDI stock were: (1)
United States, (2) China, (3) United Kingdom, (4) France, (5) Belgium, (6) Ger-
many, (7) Netherlands, (8) Spain, (9) Switzerland, (10) Canada. See U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report Annex Table 3, U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEv. (July 26, 2011), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/
WIR11_web%20tab%203.pdf (listing FDI inward stock, by region and economy,
from 1990 to 2010). In 2008, the top ten countries in terms of outward FDI stock
were: (1) United States, (2) United Kingdom, (3) Germany, (4) France, (5) China,
(6) Netherlands, (7) Switzerland, (8) Japan, (9) Belgium, (10) Spain. See U.N.
Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2011, Annex tbl.4 (July 26,
2011), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%204.
pdf. The only country among these top ten that is not party to the OECD Conven-
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monitors enforcement of the OECD Convention among member
countries, and its latest report indicates that the main countries
that supply FDI are already enforcing anti-corruption laws, though
some less well than others. 00 Moreover, one of the main sectors
with a high volume of trade between OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries, the extractive industries, is targeted directly by section 1504 of
the Dodd-Frank Act.
Therefore, U.S. anti-corruption laws are unlikely to impose sig-
nificantly higher costs on U.S. companies compared with their com-
petitors because many international companies and individuals fall
within the jurisdiction of the FCPA. In addition, many of the largest
countries in terms of FDI are already enforcing anti-corruption
laws. Concerns about U.S. companies becoming less competitive vis-
A-vis multinational firms based in emerging economies are more
compelling, but ultimately not wholly convincing. China, a major
source of both outward and inward FDI, is not party to the OECD
Convention, and many Chinese state-owned companies operating
abroad are not subject to U.S. anti-corruption laws because they are
non-issuers. However, as emerging economies like China begin to
participate more strongly in international markets, they may seek to
maintain high standards of transparency to attract foreign capital.
This will help to limit corruption as these new and powerful actors
enter the international marketplace. The United States is still the
dominant actor in global international trade, and it can help to es-
tablish an international marketplace with strong standards against
corruption. Weakening U.S. anti-corruption laws, such as by con-
straining the scope of the FCPA or section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, may set the opposite trend in motion. China's new and unprec-
edented anti-corruption law will cover companies otherwise not
covered by prevailing anti-corruption instruments. To help make
such laws meaningful, prosecutors in emerging economies need to
be able to reference prevailing norms in the international market-
place, norms that can be credible only if the United States plays a
key role.
tion is China, which is a party to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. U.N.
Convention Against Corruption, supra note 12, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 342.
100. Transparency International classifies Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States as active enforcers; Belgium, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, and Spain as moderate enforcers; and Canada as a country with little
to no enforcement. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 5 (2011), http://www.transparency.org/
content/download/61106/978536.
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B. Harm to United States Interests
Even though the coverage of U.S. anti-corruption law is broad,
it will not extend to all firms or to all international contracts. Thus,
U.S. firms may be correct when they claim that they suffer harm
from American efforts to limit corruption in international business.
However, the harm to U.S. firms has been exaggerated by the way
the issue is framed, and, more importantly, U.S. policymakers need
to distinguish between costs suffered by multinational firms head-
quartered in the United States and harms imposed on U.S. citizens
and to the U.S. national interest.
1. Costs for Footloose Firms and Government Contractors
We begin with two related cases. The first is a firm (called a
footloose firm) that can locate in many different jurisdictions de-
pending upon labor conditions and transport costs, as well as the
level of corruption. The second is a firm that seeks government
contracts, for example, to provide infrastructure, to build and oper-
ate public utilities, or to provide defense equipment and support.
The debate in the United States has focused on the claim that these
types of U.S. firms may lose business if the FCPA is vigorously
enforced.
Our central point in this section is that if a U.S. firm loses a
contract or a business opportunity in one country, the cost to that
firm is not the gross value of the contract or the profits that the
firm would have earned on that contract or business deal. Rather, it
is the difference in profits between those that would have been
earned on the corrupt deal and those earned on the honestly ob-
tained contracts and business deals that the firm takes on instead.
Of course, firms are not limited to a fixed number of contracts or
deals, but if we assume, realistically, that each contract or deal im-
poses costs, then managers will make judgments about which con-
tracts are worth bidding on and which investment projects are
worth pursuing. If they withdraw from countries where bribes are
routine, they will shift business on the margin to more honestjuris-
dictions, including, perhaps, the United States itself.
Of course, U.S. firms might have invested in relatively clean
countries even if paying bribes abroad were not illegal. A firm may
choose to avoid corrupt jurisdictions as the result of a purely self-
interested calculation. It may earn more profits in an honest coun-
try. However, one can assume that this will not always be the case.
Some firms have enough bargaining power vis-a-vis host govern-
ments so that their bribe payments permit them to earn superior
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profits. They may be able both to prevent competitors from invest-
ing and also to gain favorable tax and regulatory treatment. Then
the FCPA can constrain a firm's choices. A firm faces a restrictive
range of investment options, even if that law induces some formerly
corrupt jurisdictions to shift to bribe-free deals. Because certain
countries are off-limits, the firm may have a somewhat reduced level
of bargaining power versus host countries that hold themselves out
as honest. However, the impact is not likely to be very large. Con-
sider both government contracts and private business deals.
For government contracts, suppose that all firms have upward
sloping marginal cost curves and operate in oligopolistic markets
where excess profits are routine. These are plausible assumptions
that make the problem interesting while keeping the analysis fairly
simple. The first assumption implies that several firms would likely
divide the business in an efficient global market. If marginal costs
were constant or falling, the firm with the lowest marginal costs at
the point where supply equals demand could most efficiently supply
the entire market. Corruption could still occur, but it would be rela-
tively easy to detect if the firm that is the low cost supplier loses a
contract. 01 The second assumption means that there are excess
profits available to be divided between firms and officials, with
bribes reducing the firms' profits. We assume the existence of ex-
cess profits here, but, of course, they may be created through col-
laboration between firms and the officials who determine
procurement specifications.
Firms seek contracts in both corrupt and honest countries. To
keep things simple, suppose that countries fit easily into one or the
other category with no gray areas-a country is either corrupt or
honest. Firms tailor their behavior to the nature of the host coun-
try. Because bribes are not a part of the firms' underlying produc-
tion cost, we need to consider how they might be determined.
Suppose that all countries want to sign exactly one contract for
the same type and scale of infrastructure, for example, a road of a
particular type and length over similar terrain. Suppose that all
firms are equally able to complete the contract to a high standard
and that fixed and marginal costs are equivalent for all firms. Then,
with several firms competing for a contract, a corrupt official can
demand a bribe just high enough to keep at least one firm in the
market. If there were only one contract on offer in the world, all
101. Of course, in practice, the market is divided between suppliers in other
ways as countries demand tailor-made goods, sometimes to favor a corrupt sup-
plier. The basic argument in the text can be extended to cover that case.
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the excess profits would flow to the corrupt official in the form of a
bribe. In contrast, in an honest competition between firms, excess
profits are competed away, and all the excess benefits flow to the
state. 102 Now suppose that there are alternative locations to seek
contracts. Firms have no absolute capacity constraints, but as they
add more contracts, marginal costs rise. Thus, in an honest market,
the business will be spread among the firms in a way that equalizes
their marginal costs.
To fix these ideas, consider an industry marginal cost curve
that sums those of the individual firms. It too is obviously upward
sloping overall. Suppose that there are four countries and that each
state demands, at most, one contract. Then, consider the level of
marginal cost that corresponds to a world where each country signs
one contract. Assume that at that level of marginal cost, no country
drops out if it pays the total cost of the project (including the fixed
cost). How will the contracts be allocated?
Suppose there are two firms, firms 1 and 2. Then, because the
firms have identical increasing marginal cost curves, two contracts
will be awarded to each firm in an honest competitive market where
firms compete to supply the good. Now suppose that two states have
corrupt officials who demand bribes, and that firm 1 is a U.S. firm
subject to the FCPA and not willing to break U.S. law. Firm 2 is
from a country that is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention, and it is willing to pay bribes. Then, if the same four con-
tracts are on offer, firm 2 signs two contracts with the corrupt states,
and firm 1 signs with the honest states. Firm 2 shares some of the
rents from the contracts with the corrupt officials. This might be
done by increasing the nominal contract price, a strategy that can
work because firm 1 will not make a counter offer because it knows
that corruption is the cost of participation. The ultimate price in
the corrupt countries and the division of the rents between firm
profits and bribes would depend upon whether information about
honest contract terms constrains corrupt firms and officials. Firm 1
has "lost" the two contracts in the corrupt countries, but even in an
honest world it would never have signed more than two contracts
because its marginal costs increase as the size of its business in-
creases. It has exactly the same number of contracts as in an honest
world. The price is indeterminate but is bounded by the cost to
firm 2, the corrupt firm, of supplying the needs of an honest state,
given that it is already supplying the corrupt states. If the corrupt
102. For a detailed treatment and analysis of the dynamics of corruption, see
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 111-20
(1978).
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firm has lost its credibility with the honest state, however, this gives
the honest firm more bargaining power because dealing with firm 2
is not an option for honest country officials.
Hence, corruption in part of the market may simply rearrange
who is dealing with whom. The corrupt firm may be earning more
profits than the honest firm, but the honest firm has not lost any
business. The extra profits for the corrupt firm, if any, are pure
rents or excess profits.1 03
Now suppose that the honest firm is more efficient than the
corrupt firm so that in an honest world it would obtain three of the
four contracts before its marginal cost exceeds that of firm 2. In
that case, corruption in half of the market would lead the efficient,
honest firm to lose business. However, we should not exaggerate
the loss. It has lost one contract, not two. The key variable is the
ratio between the number of corrupt contracts (obtained by the
corrupt firms) and the number of contracts the honest firm would
obtain in an honest world. In the first example, the ratio is one,
implying no loss in contracts for the honest firm. In the second
example, it is 2/3, implying a loss of 1/3 of its contracts. In our
simple model, the maximum number of contracts firm 1 could earn
in an honest world is four, if it were very much more efficient than
firm 2 and if diseconomies of scale are small. In that case, the ratio
is 2/4, or 1/2. Firm 1 loses half of its contracts, but the conditions
for such a result seem quite extreme. This model is very simple, but
it serves to illustrate the point that the loss to an honest firm that is
also efficient will not generally equal the market share of corrupt
states. There will simply be some rearranging of the contractual
landscape reflecting firms' relative willingness to bribe.
Bribes are a cost to the firms that pay them, but they may be
profit maximizing. Bribery in part of the market may even help in-
crease contract prices in honest states by reducing market competi-
tion. The corrupt officials want to extract as much of the contract
rent as possible, but their bargaining power is limited by the exis-
tence of other states. The market will become segmented in the
sense that corrupt countries have fewer firms to choose from, while
honest countries can do business with anyone, so long as they can
prevent corrupt firms from undermining the honesty of their offi-
cials. Under the assumptions of our simple case, honest countries
103. Presumably if the corrupt firm earned less money in corrupt countries
than in honest ones, it would bid on the honest contracts as well. This would leave
the corrupt countries with no contracts. If that happened, one can assume that
corrupt officials would modify their demands to be sure that they are not shut out
of the market.
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will always sign contracts with firm 1, the honest firm, because the
marginal cost to that firm of signing these contracts is below the
corresponding marginal cost for firm 2 that has already locked in
two corrupt contracts.
Major simplifications in the above model are the fixed number
and size of contracts demanded by host countries. Suppose, instead,
that each country can decide the scale of the project it wants to
obtain. Assume that there are project-level economies so that each
country will select only one firm to carry out its project. Bribery has
an ambiguous impact on scale. On the one hand, it will generally
increase the overall cost of the project as the firm incorporates the
bribery cost into the price. This may lead the state to reduce the
scale of the project compared to an honest world. Bribery acts like a
tax that increases the per unit price.104 On the other hand, corrup-
tion at the very top in a kleptocratic system may lead to excessive
public spending as the ruler and his cronies try to maximize their
bribery revenues at the expense of their own population.105
In the former case where project scale falls, the loss to an hon-
est, efficient firm is less than when contract sizes are fixed. It does
not obtain corrupt contracts, but these are smaller than honest con-
tracts, and the honest firm faces less aggressive competition for
honest business. In the latter case where project scale increases, the
corrupt firm and a country's leaders collude to maximize their
rents. The honest firm obtains the same benefits as above, but the
divergence between the profits of honest and corrupt firms may be
larger because project scales are larger. However, the corrupt firm's
gains may be squeezed out as the country's rulers extort higher
payoffs over time. Contracts may be large in scale, but they may not
provide many profits. At the same time, the firm may also lose a
reputation for probity and may find it hard to compete honestly in
other venues. It can be caught in a trap where contractual relation-
ships that look lucrative at first deteriorate over time. It is also, of
104. See Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann & Pablo Zoido-
Lobaton, Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69
Countries, 76J. PUB. ECON. 459, 481 (2000) (using cross-country data to show that
greater corruption correlates with smaller government size and lesser official eco-
nomic activity).
105. There is evidence that fully kleptocratic states overspend on at least some
aspects of government. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 115-16, 119 (1999); Jacqueline Coolidge &
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Kleptocracy and Reform in African Regimes: Theory and Cases, in
CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
(Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 1999) (providing African
case studies).
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course, at risk of regime change that undermines the value of lucra-
tive corrupt relationships. 0 6
A similar analysis can be carried out for investment deals where
the foreign firm seeks permission to open a manufacturing or sales
facility and needs government approval. Again, start with equally
efficient firms, but assume that approvals are granted to any firm
that fulfills certain qualifications. The state does not impose a fixed
limit on entry; market pressures take care of the volume of business.
Then, so long as honestly administered registration programs are
not characterized by stifling red tape, firms are distributed as the
market dictates. Corruption then skews firm locations so corrupt
firms locate in corrupt jurisdictions, but the existence of honest ju-
risdictions limits the bargaining power of corrupt officials. The re-
sulting location patterns may impose some costs on honest firms as
they give up certain markets and accept longer transport routes for
export goods. However, the costs to these firms are just the marginal
profits lost from locating in a somewhat less profitable venue, not
the total profits they could have earned in the corrupt location.
One should only consider the difference between profits at the al-
ternative locations.
If honest registration systems are riddled with red tape and de-
lay that corruption can cut through, then the costs will be higher
for honest firms, but they still must be measured in terms of oppor-
tunity costs, not the profits earned by the corrupt. Furthermore,
entrenched corruption can itself lead to heightened red tape as
corrupt officials create more and more problems in their efforts to
extract bribes. 0 7 Once again, the investor may be stuck in a vicious
spiral of bribery, extortion, and escalating bureaucratic demand
that can lead to worse results than a clear stand against payoffs. 108
Of course, in both cases the impact of corrupt systems depends
upon the existence of honest alternatives. Honest firms have op-
106. For examples from Tunisia and Egypt, see Issandr El Amrani, Probes
Spread Alarm in Egypt's Businesses, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/ee4fa8ec-6b75-1 1eO-a53e-00144feab49a.html#axzzl Zj0o5uvY. See also
Bill Waite & Martin Stone, Regime Change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya: A Stimulus for
the Prosecutorial Authorities, RISK ADVISORY GROUP (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.risk
advisory.net/analysis/story/regime-change-in-tunisia-egypt-and-libya-a-stimulus-
for-the-prosecutorial-a (explaining why regime change stimulates anti-corruption
activity and describing the situation in Egypt and Tunisia).
107. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 16-17, 34-35.
108. For example, corruption may have detrimental effects on privatization.
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 38. For a more detailed treatment of cor-
ruption in regulatory programs and competitive bureaucracies, see ROSE-ACKER-
MAN, supra note 102, at 137-66.
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tions that give them bargaining power to resist corruption and to
exit to an alternative location. However, outside options do not al-
ways exist. In the next section, we consider cases where exit is not
possible, unless one simply exits the business entirely.
2. Extractive Industries
The extraction of petroleum and hard rock minerals is particu-
larly subject to corruption.109 Much development depends upon
joint ventures or concession agreements with host governments or
state-owned firms. Firms must sign long-term contracts to justify
their investments, and revenue from these investments is a signifi-
cant source of income for host countries. The main feature that
distinguishes this sector from government procurement and from
investments in footloose industries is the fixed and limited location
of the raw materials. Investors are forced to deal with certain gov-
ernments if the firms are to remain in the industry. This fact gives
government officials considerable bargaining power that can be
used for illicit gain. However, if U.S. firms refuse to deal with cor-
rupt governments, the impact on the U.S. economy is likely to be
small. The officials will turn to other less scrupulous firms, and cor-
rupt kickbacks will harm the citizens of mineral-rich countries who
share little in the gains. These citizens bear most of the losses. So
long as the resources enter the global marketplace, corruption will
have little impact on the world economy beyond a possible increase
in price if kickbacks increase the costs of exploring for and develop-
ing these resources.
The serious harm imposed on citizens of resource-rich coun-
tries has led to specialized civil society efforts such as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative that seeks to encourage firms and
states to reveal payments made in connection with contracts and
concessions, and to a section of the Dodd-Frank Act that codified a
version of this initiative into U.S. law. Firms that refrain from brib-
ery or that simply agree to report payments complain that their be-
havior will cost them lucrative deals. Even though the coverage of
these anti-corruption and transparency initiatives includes all firms
listed on the U.S. exchanges, some U.S.-based firms may lose con-
tracts to those not subject to U.S. law.
However, the harm to the interests of the United States is not
the net profits of the lost deals. Like all primary products, minerals
enter into international commerce and their prices depend upon
109. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 97 (ranking oil and gas as the
third most corrupt sector and mining as the fifth most corrupt sector).
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the operation of the global market, not the home countries of the
firms that extract the minerals or drill for the oil and gas. 110 It
seems unlikely that the name of the firm that signs a deal with a
corrupt government will affect the global price and distribution sys-
tem in any of these markets. If corruption is very widespread, it may
act like a tax on the resource that raises global prices somewhat, but
by less than the total bribery bill. If that happens, the bribes paid by
some will benefit honest firms from the United States and else-
where, which can sell their product at higher prices. Assuming that
the world market for the resource is competitive, the world price is
determined by the marginal cost of extraction at the point where
supply equals demand.
In contrast, if corrupt states produce resources that are rela-
tively cheap to extract, bribery will not affect the quantity of output.
Hence, the world price will be unaffected. For example, if kickbacks
are common for oil concessions in the Gulf States where produc-
tion costs are very low, they will not affect the global price. The
result will be higher gains for corrupt top officials compared to the
owners of multinational firms.
In the case of the oil industry, of course, a group of producers,
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), does
influence world prices and quantities. The existence of OPEC is an
additional reason why corruption in a subset of countries is unlikely
to have much effect on the price of petroleum in the United States.
Hence, if world prices are not affected, the cost of a lost con-
tract to U.S. interests is only the marginal cost to the firm from
investing elsewhere, if that is possible, or reducing operations, if
not, multiplied by the share of profits that flow to U.S. investors.
Very few U.S. jobs will be lost, and there may even be some job
gains if the industry turns to U.S. sources or seeks synthetic or natu-
ral substitutes in the United States. The basic point is that the prod-
ucts of extractive industries are of no value if they are not eventually
exploited, so it does not matter much to the U.S. economy overall
which firm exploits the resource. If corruption is very widespread or
is concentrated in states with high cost marginal producers, world
prices might be higher when corrupt deals exist, but market pres-
sures from substitutes are likely to limit that effect. Of course, the
cost to the corrupt host country's citizens can be severe, and we
discuss that below. Our point is simply that even if U.S. policymak-
110. See Angus Deaton & Ronald Miller, International Commodity Prices,
Macroeconomic Perfomance, and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 79 PRINCETON STUDIES
IN INT'L FIN. 1 (1995), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-deaton/down
loads/InternationalCommodityPrices.pdf.
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ers ignore these broader public interest concerns, the net costs to
U.S. economic interests are much less than the rhetoric coming
from critics of a strong U.S. policy would have us believe."'
III.
BENEFITS
So far, we have argued that the claimed costs to American busi-
ness from limiting corruption in international business deals are
often exaggerated. We now turn to consider the countervailing ben-
efits. Three types of potential benefits are most important.
First, in some situations U.S. firms will find it profit maximizing
to oppose payoffs and to monitor the behavior of their managers
and sub-contractors even without outside enforcement or pressure.
A firm with low costs or high quality may gain leverage with its buy-
ers or suppliers by taking a strong stand against corruption. Then
individual profit-maximization and the avoidance of corruption go
together. This optimistic scenario does describe certain situations,
but it is unlikely to be widespread enough to eliminate the need for
action at the national and international levels to discourage payoffs
in international business.
Second, corruption is costly to host countries, and these costs
can harm U.S. interests broadly understood. 112 Firms pay bribes to
get favored treatment on contracts, concessions, and privatization
deals.11 3 Managers justify their behavior as a means to create eco-
nomic value and as a necessary, if unpleasant, response to the weak-
ness and venality of governments. However, high-level corruption is
very harmful in the countries where it is pervasive, especially for the
111. See, e.g., WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 5-6 ("The current FCPA
enforcement environment has been costly to business.... There is also reason to
believe that the FCPA has made U.S. businesses less competitive than their foreign
counterparts who do not have significant FCPA exposure.").
112. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 18-23, 35-38 (describing
generally corrupt payments made to avoid regulation and lower taxes). The evi-
dence is summarized and relevant literature cited in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Govern-
ance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 301, 303-10 (Bjorn
Lomborg ed., 2004). For a useful aggregation of cross-country data, see Daniel
Kaufman, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 4280,
2007). See also Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent
Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROc. 409, 412-13 (1993)
(demonstrating that corruption and other measures of poor governance harm
growth and reduce income levels). Of course, there may be a vicious cycle where
corruption retards growth, and low growth and income levels fuel corruption.
113. See generally RosE-AcKERMAN, supra note 105, at 27-38 (describing the
abundant corruption opportunities associated with privatization).
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poor.114 Corruption can introduce inefficiencies that reduce com-
petitiveness.' 15 It may limit the number of bidders, favor those with
inside connections, limit the information available to participants,
and introduce added bargaining costs. Corrupt officials may favor
an inefficient level, composition, and time path of investment. Gov-
ernment produces too many of the wrong kinds of projects. It over-
spends even on projects that are fundamentally sound and receives
too little from privatizations and the award of concessions. Buyers
that obtain privatized firms through bribery often gain monopolies
that undermine the efficiency benefits of private ownership.' 1 6 If
corruption distorts the business environment and retards growth,
then corruption in government contracts and concessions can slow
down economic growth and limit the future opportunities for in-
vestment and trade that would arise from better economic condi-
tions.1 1 7 It can also harm U.S. firms in other industries that might
have been able to take advantage of some of those business oppor-
tunities. Thus, industries, including those based in the United
States, that benefit from strong private sectors in emerging econo-
mies worldwide ought to support efforts to limit corruption that
can distort and slow host country growth.
A myopic, inward-looking United States might ignore these
costs of corruption, but if we take a broader, more long-term view
of our role in the world and of the value of preventing unrest, limit-
ing corruption globally can have important benefits. Anti-corrup-
tion policies will, of course, have to extend beyond efforts to deter
U.S. firms from paying bribes, but a reduction in payoffs from U.S.
114. See generally Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi & Rosa Alonso-Terme, Does
Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, 3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 23, 40 (2002)
(arguing that high levels of corruption increase income inequality and poverty).
115. See, e.g., Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International Inves-
tors?, 82 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 8 (2000) (analyzing corruption as a tax on
investors).
116. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 35-38, 42-44 (explaining
how privatizations in certain contexts may be corrupt transactions that ultimately
defeat the efficiency rationale for privatization).
117. See Toke S. Aidt, Corruption and Sustainable Development, in 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 3, 37, 40 (Susan Rose-Ack-
erman & Tina Soreide, eds., forthcoming 2011); Toke S. Aidt, Corruption,
Institutions, and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'y 271, 285-88
(2009); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35J. ECON.
LrERATuRE 1320, 1327-28 (1997). Aidt argues that even if corruption may seem to
further growth in the short run, it is likely the result of too much investment for
short-run corrupt gain that is not sustainable in the long run and can harm envi-
ronmental and other values.
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firms is a necessary if not a sufficient condition. If the United States
sets a strong example, other countries can be encouraged to follow.
Third, market actors benefit from the overall integrity of the
international marketplace. Even if an individual corrupt deal is
profit-making, pervasive corruption undermines the legitimacy of
the international marketplace and raises the risks of doing business.
Widespread unscrupulous behavior can erode public confidence in
the market and seriously affect the performance of honest entre-
preneurs. Hence, firms ought to support international anti-corrup-
tion efforts when the global situation is a "coordination game."
Although bribe payments may be profit-maximizing in the existing
business context, if corruption could be limited, all firms would
benefit and none would have an incentive to defect. In contrast, the
strategic situation among competitors may resemble a "prisoner's
dilemma" where voluntary agreements to refrain from corruption
will be unstable. Each firm has an incentive to defect. Even if one
argues that firms have an obligation to act consistently with the effi-
cient functioning of the market, they are caught in a prisoner's di-
lemma, and global initiatives are needed to keep firms from acting
unilaterally.' 18 Once again, the role of U.S.-based multinationals as
leaders in international trade and investment can help set a stan-
dard for multinationals generally.
Hence, although no one has put a solid dollar number on ei-
ther the costs or the benefits of the U.S. policy against corruption
in international business, the net benefits, understood broadly, ap-
pear substantial. The benefits are not just gains in the efficiency
and fairness of the international marketplace, but also increased
pressures on corrupt states and large firms to move in a more hon-
est direction.
CONCLUSIONS
On balance, an aggressive and clearly articulated position
against international corruption is in the U.S. national interest.
Critics of the current law have exaggerated the costs and underap-
preciated the benefits. Given the apparent scale of the problem of
corruption in international business dealings and the harm caused
by seeming to pull back, recent efforts to weaken the law are
unwarranted.
118. This paragraph summarizes the arguments in Susan Rose-Ackerman,
"Grand" Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1889,
1904-07 (2002).
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The U.S. Congress should resist supporting the Chamber of
Commerce's entire wish list of amendments to the FCPA. Although
some respond to valid concerns, most would weaken the law. At the
top of the Chamber's list is allowing a company to raise a compli-
ance defense, similar to that included in the new U.K Bribery
Act.1 19 Other desired amendments include clarifying and narrow-
ing the definition of a "foreign official," particularly with respect to
state-owned companies; imposing a "willfulness" requirement for
criminal liability; and limiting a company's liability for both the pre-
vious actions of an acquired company as well as for the actions
taken by subsidiaries. 120 The Chamber does have a valid point when
it observes that few cases are resolved by judicial opinions because
the incentive to settle is so strong. This means that courts have not
defined vague terms. Perhaps the DOJ and the SEC should carry
out rulemakings to fix definitions more clearly. However, it does
not follow from these complaints that the government's response
should be to weaken the legal standards.
The Chamber argues that its suggested amendments will con-
tribute to American economic recovery.12' As we noted above, the
Chamber's argument is based on the growing importance of inter-
national trade,' 22 surely an odd reason to be less concerned with
corruption unless one is completely indifferent to the costs im-
posed on people in corrupt countries and to the harm to the repu-
tations of the United States and its multinational firms. The
Chamber claims that the FCPA forces many companies to change
how and where they are doing business. For example, the Chamber
argues that "[t]he uncertainty about how much due diligence is suf-
ficient, coupled with the threat of successor liability even if thor-
ough due diligence is undertaken, have in recent years had a
significant chilling effect on mergers and acquisitions,"123 and it
119. Lisa A. Rickard, The Ambiguous FCPA: In Need of Updates and Clarifications,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 5, 2011), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/component/ilr-president comer/66/article/74.html.
120. Id.
121. The Chamber claims that its proposals "will help grow jobs during a time
when millions of U.S. citizens are looking for one." Kim, supra note 6.
122. Id.
123. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 15. See also The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2011) (written testimony of Michael B.
Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), available at http://judici-
ary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mukasey06142011.pdf ("[Tlhe FCPA, as it is cur-
rently written and enforced, leaves corporations vulnerable to civil and criminal
penalties for a wide variety of conduct that is in many cases beyond their control or
even their knowledge."); Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation's Effect on
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claims that "many companies have ceased foreign operations rather
than face the uncertainties of FCPA enforcement." 124 However,
even if this does sometimes occur, it is not a good measure of the
costs of the FCPA. Rather than being a critique of the law, this state-
ment indicates that the FCPA is having an impact and may lead
countries that wish to do business with U.S. firms to crack down on
domestic corruption. Furthermore, as we have argued, even if the
law does lead some U.S. firms to rearrange their business dealing,
they are likely to end up almost as well off as before, and for extrac-
tive industries the impact on prices and quantities in the United
States is likely to be small.125 Some jobs that might otherwise have
gone abroad may even remain in the United States where corrup-
tion is less pervasive.
Chamber criticisms of the vague language and lack of decided
court cases have more merit. However, their solutions would mostly
weaken the law. Particularly troubling is the Chamber's proposal to
introduce a relatively narrow definition of a "foreign official,"' 26
which could create a major loophole. In general, the Chamber
seeks to limit a firm's liability in various ways by, for example, ad-
ding a willfulness requirement for criminal liability, a compliance
defense, and limiting liability for the actions of a subsidiary. 127 All
of the proposed changes would make it marginally easier to pay
bribes abroad and to avoid liability under the FCPA. Given the diffi-
culty of bringing cases under the current law, the relatively limited
nature of the harm to U.S. interests broadly understood, and the
need for the United States to lead in this area of global concern,
acting on proposals to weaken the FCPA would be a serious mis-
take. If clarity is deemed valuable to limit transaction costs for
America's Global Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 40 (2011) (written testimony of John H.
Beisner, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Beisner0524201 I.pdf ("Companies going
through DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement proceedings often spend tens of millions
of dollars, if not more, on attorneys and forensic accountants-on top of poten-
tially multimillion-dollar criminal and civil fines and disgorgement-in order to
determine whether their employees (often at a relatively low level) acted
improperly.").
124. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 6.
125. See supra Part II (arguing that the costs to a U.S. firm from losing a con-
tract or business opportunity is limited to the difference in profits between a cor-
rupt deal and an honest contract. In extractive industries so long as the resource
enters into the international market, the U.S. economy will not be significantly
affected).
126. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 24.
127. Id. at 7. See also KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 3.
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firms, it can be achieved consistent with strong enforcement of the
law through agency interpretations or amendments that clarify firm
liability without weakening the law's incentive to institute internal
controls and carry out comprehensive due diligence. Those who
think that the law is too strongly enforced neglect the fact that
FCPA cases are difficult and costly for the DOJ. Hence, many trans-
actions and deals are never examined. Firm compliance depends
on the signals sent by settlements and decided cases that keep the
business community alert to the costs of violating the law. Enforce-
ment needs to be credible and effective, not hedged about with new
constraints.
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